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Judicial Intervention in Arbitration: Unresolved Jurisdictional Issues Concerning Arbitrator 




Parties find it difficult to determine which Nigerian High Court should intervene in the appointment of 
arbitrators due to conflicting judicial precedents. This perennial challenge has defied any legal solution. 
Considering relevant case law, this article examines the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (ACA) vis-à-vis the 
Nigerian Constitution. The main argument is that the Nigerian Constitution read alongside the ACA confers 
the Federal High Court with additional jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators regardless of which court has 
jurisdiction concerning the underlying dispute. There are also uncertainties regarding the intervention 
jurisdiction of Nigeria’s National Industrial Court to appoint arbitrators. Currently, no other court can 
exercise intervention jurisdiction in employment disputes. This article analyses recent decisions of the 
National Industrial Court and argues that this Court can only intervene to appoint arbitrators where both 
parties request the appointment in a pending action before the Court. It is also argued that decisions 




Many parties involved in commercial dealings have demonstrated a clear preference for arbitration as a means of 
resolving disputes that arise during commercial transactions.1 There are several reasons for choosing arbitration 
over litigation. Examples include simplicity, privacy, and expertise.2 Arguably, however, the most practical reason 
for choosing arbitration is to avoid the courts – with all the attendant uncertainties that come with litigation. This 
is because arbitral decisions are final and binding on the parties.3 One such uncertainty of litigation is how courts 
may resolve jurisdictional issues and how long such a determination may last.  The possibility of the court’s 
involvement in arbitration cannot be discounted and it may be necessary to take practical measures that discourage 
parties from unnecessarily seeking or insisting on judicial intervention. In Nigeria, for example, a recent directive 
from the highest judicial office mandated lower courts to discourage a breach of arbitration clauses.4  This 
directive illustrates the tendency of parties to seek judicial intervention in Nigerian arbitration matters despite the 
emergence of arbitration as a major means of resolving disputes.5 Jurisdictional questions inevitably arise when 
parties take a litigious step in Nigeria.  
Jurisdictional issues in Nigeria are complex. One such complexity in the Nigerian court system is 
determining which court should exercise jurisdiction over a dispute. It is important first to understand the rather 
complicated court structure in Nigeria vis-à-vis jurisdiction. Nigeria is a federation that comprises thirty-six states, 
 
1 G Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 2014, Kluwer Law International) 1. 
2 Ibid at 2. See further, E Robine, “What companies expect of international commercial arbitration” (1992) 9/2 Journal of International 
Arbitration at 31. 
3 B Nigel and C Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (2015, 6th edn, Oxford University Press) at 2. 
4 See the memo (“Re: Arbitration Clause in Commercial Contracts”) from the Chief Justice of Nigeria to all courts dated 26 November 2017. 
On delays and complexities of courts, see CA Candide-Johnson and O Shasore, Commercial Arbitration Law and International Practice in 
Nigeria (2012, LexisNexis) at 7 – 10. 
5 Nigel and Partasides argued that “arbitration is now the principal method of resolving international disputes involving states, individuals and 




each of which has a State High Court.6 The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) also has a High Court.7 Nigeria has a 
Federal High Court with various divisions across the Federation.8 The State High Courts have unlimited 
jurisdiction subject to the exclusive jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and, since 2010, the National Industrial 
Court.9 The High Courts are otherwise courts of coordinate jurisdiction. 
Under the Nigerian judicial system, it can be challenging to determine which of the High Courts should 
have jurisdiction over a dispute because jurisdiction rules are technical and rather complex.10 Such an impasse 
often adversely affects litigants who suffer the consequences of “inelegant drafting” and “interest-based 
interpretations”.11 Associated Discount House Limited v Amalgamated Trustees Limited12 is illustrative. In this 
case, the respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court over a banker/customer dispute. The 
Federal High Court upheld the respondent’s jurisdictional challenge, declined jurisdiction with respect to the 
dispute and redirected the parties to the Lagos State High Court. Here again, the respondent challenged the 
jurisdiction of the State High Court. The jurisdictional challenge was dismissed. The respondent then appealed to 
the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, deciding that the State High Court did not have 
jurisdiction. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court which ruled that the State High Court had 
jurisdiction over the dispute and sent the matter back to the Lagos State High Court for trial after nearly a decade 
of litigation that did not concern the substance of the case.  In Oladipo v Nigeria Customs Service Board,13 the 
Court of Appeal also observed that the appellant’s grievance was not addressed in either the State High Court or 
the Federal High Court for more than half a decade due to a jurisdictional challenge.14 Some delays have lasted 
up to two decades. 15 Such delays highlight the benefits of arbitration. Party autonomy and the potential to expedite 
dispute resolution underpin arbitration.16 
This article is based on three major arguments. First, the impasse that arises from the jurisdictional tussle 
between the Federal and the State High Courts can be resolved to facilitate court intervention in arbitration by 
interpreting section 251(1) of the Constitution alongside section 57 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
(“hereafter the ACA”). In this context, the Nigerian legislature has conferred additional jurisdiction on the Federal 
 
6 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended by the 3rd Alteration Amendment Act 2010) – hereafter, “the Constitution” 
in text and “CFRN” in footnotes, s 270(1).  
7 Ibid, s 255(1). For the purposes of this article, “State High Courts” include the High Court of the FCT except where otherwise stated. 
8 Id at s 249(1). 
9 NUT Niger State v COSST, Niger State [2012] 10 NWLR (Pt 1307) 89 at 109. 
10 Abiri CJ argued that “The conflict of jurisdiction between the Federal and State High Courts mocks the efficiency of the judicial system in 
Nigeria. Statutes that confer jurisdiction on the courts are of no use if the ambits of such jurisdiction are not clearly delimited and 
unambiguous”.  See K Abiri, Identifying and Delineating the Frontiers of the Jurisdiction of the State High Court vis-à-vis other Courts of 
Coordinate Jurisdiction (Paper presented at the induction course for newly appointed Judges and Khadis organised by the National Judicial 
Institute from 15 to 23 June 2015) 28. A decade earlier, the Supreme Court had observed that the jurisdictional struggles between the Federal 
High Court and the State High Courts was perennial and no easy resolution was in sight. See Onuorah v Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical 
Co Ltd [2005] 16 WRN 1, 14 – 15. 
11 Abiri, above at note 10 at 28. 
12 [2006] 5 SC (Pt 1) 32. 
13 [2009] 12 NWLR (Pt 1156) 563. 
14 Ibid per CC Nweze JCA. See also, WEMA Securities & Finance Plc v Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corp (2015) LPELR-24833(SC). See 
further on jurisdictional conflicts amongst the Federal and States High Courts in Nigeria: CC Nweze, “Jurisdiction of the State High Court” 
in E Azinqe (ed), Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction (2005, Oliz Publishers) 85 at 90; AG Karibi-Whyte, The Federal High Court: Law and Practice 
(FDP  1986); A Emiola, “Implication and Complications of Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree 1991” (1992)3/8–9 Justice 1; Y 
Fashakin, “Jurisdictional limitation of the Federal High Court in banker/customer relationship” (2003) 7/1 –2 Modern Practice Journal of 
Finance and Investment Law 231 at 234; PC Okorie, ”Extent of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in fundamental human rights cases 
in Nigeria: A Review of the Supreme Court Decision in Grace Jack v University of Agriculture, Makurdi” (2004) 2 Nigerian Bar Journal 
241; O Ogbuinya, Understanding the Concept of Jurisdiction in the Nigerian Legal System (Snaap Press Ltd, 2008) 290-333 and ST Hon, 
Civil Procedure in Nigeria (vol 1 Pearl Publishers  2008) 357-384; PN Okoli and CI Umeche, “Jurisdictional conflicts and individual liberty 
– the encroaching burden of technicality in Nigeria” (2018) 22/4 The International Journal of Human Rights 473; E Essien, “The jurisdiction 
of State High Courts” (2000) 44/2 Journal of African Law 264. 
15See for instance SPDCN Ltd v Isaiah [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt 723)168; Oni v Cadbury Nigeria Plc (2016) LPELR-26061(SC). 




High Court to intervene in arbitration irrespective of the subject matter of the underlying dispute. Thus, where 
jurisdiction over the underlying dispute is in doubt, litigants should apply to the Federal High Court to intervene 
in all cases. Second, for employment related disputes over which the National Industrial Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction, it should not intervene to enforce the arbitration agreement by appointing arbitrators where the parties 
are unable to appoint. Litigants should seek the National Industrial Court’s intervention in appointing arbitrators 
by instituting a claim before the National Industrial Court and then, by mutual agreement, request the National 
Industrial Court to appoint arbitrators.  Third, the confusion as to whether court interventions in arbitrator 
appointments in Nigeria can be appealed should be cleared by applying Skye Bank Limited v Iwu.17 Based on this 
Supreme Court decision, litigants have the right to appeal all final first instance decisions of the High Courts.    
There is a foundational necessity to examine the issue of jurisdiction concerning the court’s intervention 
in arbitrator appointment where parties are unable to do so. This article provides a perspective which seems to 
have escaped any court decision or scholarly commentary. The overarching argument is that section 251(1) of the 
Constitution read alongside section 57 of the ACA provides additional jurisdiction for the Federal High Court to 
intervene in arbitration notwithstanding the subject matter of the underlying dispute.18 If the courts accept this 
argument, it would mean that the confusion as to which of the High Courts would have jurisdiction can be 
eliminated by approaching the Federal High Court. This approach will also facilitate access to justice when parties 
find themselves in the remit of litigation. 
 
Arbitrator Appointments and Access to the Courts 
Parties can avoid navigating the landmine of first determining which of the High Courts have jurisdiction to 
resolve their disputes by choosing arbitration.  This advantage is, however, obviated when the parties cannot agree 
on choice of arbitrator(s) or settle for a third party other than the courts to make the choice for them. In this case, 
the parties’ only recourse will be to seek the court’s assistance to help constitute the arbitral tribunal, known as 
the default procedure.19 It is critical to determine which of the High Courts parties should approach to assist in the 
appointment of arbitrators.   
Certain court decisions indicate that, pursuant to the ACA, either the Federal High Court or the High 
Court can exercise jurisdiction to intervene in the appointment of arbitrators irrespective of the underlying 
dispute.20 Such decisions conflict with some other decisions and scholarly views that are premised on the 
superiority of the Constitution over the ACA.21  They argue the ACA cannot extend the Federal, FCT and State 
High Courts’ jurisdictions to intervene in the appointment of arbitrators irrespective of the subject matter of the 
dispute.  
The emergence of the National Industrial Court as a court of coordinate jurisdiction with the Federal, 
FCT and State High Courts in 2010 has further complicated the jurisdiction to intervene in the appointment of 
 
17 (2017) LPELR-42595(SC). 
18 i.e. the jurisdiction conferred by the National Assembly with respect to certain disputes under s 251 of the Constitution. 
19 In summary, where a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within the stipulated time despite having been given due notice to so appoint, the 
courts can appoint arbitrators when approached by the party who had served notice on the erring party, to ensure the arbitral tribunal is properly 
constituted to resolve the dispute between the parties. See ACA, s 7(2)(a)(i) -(ii),(b), (3). See further, Royal Exchange Assurance v Bentworth 
Finance (Nig) Ltd [1976] NSCC 648. 
20ACA, s 57(1). Such decisions will be examined shortly.  
21 The Constitution delineates the jurisdiction of the Federal, FCT and State High Courts. See CFRN ss 249, 255 and 270.  The scholarly views 




arbitrators vis-à-vis labour/employment disputes.22  Given the extensive jurisdiction that the Nigerian Constitution 
vests in the National Industrial Court, it should have jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators in labour/employment 
disputes.  In three recent decisions examined in this article, the parties had all unsuccessfully requested the 
National Industrial Court to appoint arbitrators.23 This amounted to a waste of time. More time and resources 
would have been wasted if the National Industrial Court exercised jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeal overturned 
the National Industrial Court’s decision.  Furthermore, even more time and resources would have been wasted if 
a party challenged an award based on an alleged irregularity in the appointment of arbitrators because the National 
Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction.  
The question of appealing the decisions of intervening courts is a constant thread that runs through 
judicial intervention in the appointment of arbitrators. Therefore, it is also necessary to consider whether the 
decision of the Federal or State High Courts appointing arbitrators can be appealed. There are conflicting judicial 
decisions and scholarly views in this area. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Skye Bank Plc v Iwu,24 however, 
supports this article’s argument that parties can appeal decisions of the High Courts that concern the appointment 
of arbitrators.  
 
The Courts and Judicial Officers as Appointing Authority versus the Default Appointment Procedure 
There is a need to understand party autonomy vis-à-vis judicial officers appointing arbitrators under Nigerian law. 
Parties have full autonomy in deciding the composition of the arbitral tribunal. Thus, sections 6 and 7 of the ACA 
only contain provisions that apply where the parties have failed to reach an agreement. Thus, in constituting the 
arbitral tribunal, reference will always be made first to the terms agreed by the parties. Their agreement (e.g. on 
sole arbitrator, multiple arbitrators, specified qualifications etc.) must be given full effect.  The court can only 
intervene and appoint arbitrators in one or more of the following limited exceptions: (1) the parties have failed to 
agree on a sole arbitrator;25 (2) a party has failed to appoint its nominated arbitrator;26 (3) the parties’ nominated 
arbitrators have failed to agree on a presiding arbitrator;27 (4) the appointing authority specified in the parties’ 
agreement have failed to appoint the arbitrator;28 or (5) where the parties fail or are unable to replace the arbitrator 
under section 11 of the ACA to fill a vacancy as a result of the arbitrator’s termination or revocation of 
appointment, removal or withdrawal from office.29  
The primacy of party autonomy with regard to the appointment of arbitrators can be illustrated through 
Backbone Connectivity Network Nigeria Limited and Others v Backbone Technology Network Incorporated.30 
The Court of Appeal decided that it is only after a party has failed to cooperate in the appointment process and, 
consequently a party applies to the court to appoint an arbitrator, that the court can intervene and appoint 
arbitrators. Thus, the court can neither order the parties to appoint arbitrators where there is no application before 
the court in that respect nor can the court on its own motion appoint arbitrators. 
 
22 See s 254C (1) of the CFRN and s 7 of the  National Industrial Court Act 2006 on the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. 
23 Ravelli v Digitsteel Integrated Services Ltd, Suit No: NICN/LA/559/2016, Kanyip J (16 February 2018); Prakash v Orleans Invest Holdings, 
Suit No: NICN/LA/521/2017, Bassi J (5 March 2018); Michael Ajilore v KLM Airlines, Suit No: NICN/LA/617/2017, Bassi J (31 May 2018). 
24 Above at note 17. 
25 ACA s 7(2)(b). 
26 ibid s 7(3)(a). 
27 ibid s 7(3)(b). 
28 ibid s 7(3)(c). 
29 See JO Orojo and MA Ajomo, Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria (1999, Mbeyi & Associates) 121. 




A party cannot appoint arbitrators upon default of the other party except where the agreement so 
provides.31 A party must have been notified to appoint or concur in the appointment of an arbitrator prior to the 
court exercising jurisdiction to appoint arbitrator upon default of the party.32 Only parties to an arbitration 
agreement have legal standing to apply to the court to appoint an arbitrator.33 Considering the ‘list procedure’, 
there are detailed guidelines on the appointment of sole arbitrators,34 and multi-member arbitral tribunals.35 
Judicial officers usually appoint arbitrators in two capacities: (1) where the arbitration agreement names 
a judicial office holder in which case he is constituted an appointing authority and (2) where the intervention 
jurisdiction of the court is invoked. It is necessary to draw a distinction between a judicial officer as appointing 
authority by agreement of the parties and appointment of an arbitrator by the court in default of the parties. In the 
former, the judicial officer performs a personal and not a judicial function and as such, the judicial process need 
not determine the procedure for appointment.36  In such a case, the judicial officer acts as appointing authority by 
agreement of the parties in the same manner as any qualified office holder could act as appointing authority if the 
parties agree. The situation is different when the judicial officer exercises the default appointment powers under 
section 7(2)(a) and (b) of the ACA.   Where the parties have agreed that a judicial officer should appoint the 
arbitrator, they merely need to ask the judicial officer to do so. The default mode of appointment by the courts is 
activated is only when the judicial officer has failed or is unable to appoint the arbitrator pursuant to the parties’ 
agreement. The court does not exercise judicial powers where the judicial officer is constituted as appointing 
authority based on the parties’ agreement. Thus, the question of jurisdiction does not arise.  Celtel Nigeria BV v 
Econet Wireless Limited37 illustrates the distinction between the judge acting as appointing authority and the 
default appointment procedure. The arbitration agreement specified the Chief Judge (CJ) of the Federal High 
Court as appointing authority. Econet applied to Ukeje CJ to appoint an arbitrator. Ukeje CJ declined to appoint 
any arbitrator. As a result, Econet applied to the Lagos State High Court to appoint an arbitrator in default of the 
parties. Whilst this application was pending at the Lagos State High Court, Econet applied to Mustapha CJ who 
had succeeded Ukeje CJ at the Federal High Court. Mustapha CJ then appointed arbitrators. The Court of Appeal 
noted that the action of Mustapha CJ was proper in view of the arbitration agreement, notwithstanding the pending 
application at the Lagos High Court for judicial intervention. Mustapha CJ, as the successor of Ukeje CJ, could 
therefore consider a fresh request for the appointment of arbitrators. As the court observed: “It is only after a 
decision is reached under Section 7(3) of the ACA that the point of no return is reached… That is why there is no 
right of appeal from the decision of the appointing authority in Section 7 of the ACA”.38  
 
31 Campagnie Generale de Geophysique v Etuk [2004] 1 NWLR (Pt 853) 20 at 49; Fidelity Bank Plc v Jimmy Rose Co Ltd [2012] 6 CLRN 82 
at 92.   
32 City Engineering Ltd v Nigerian Airports Authority [1999] 11 NWLR (Pt 625) 76 at 86.  
33 Kano State Oil and Allied Products Limited v Kofa Trading Company Limited [1996] 3 NWLR (Pt 436) 244 at 247. 
34 See art 6(2) of the Arbitration Rules – made pursuant to ACA ss 15(1) and 53 and annexed as ACA schedule I. see also s 7(2)(b). For further 
insight on the rationale behind such guidelines, see PO Idornigie, Commercial Arbitration Law and Practice in Nigeria (LawLords 2015) 194 
– 198. On the need to comply with arbitrator qualifications prescribed by the arbitration agreement, see ACA s 7(5). See Rahcassi Shipping 
Company SA v Blue Star Line Ltd [1967] 3 ALL ER 301. In this case, the English High Court decided that the appointment of an arbitrator 
who lacked qualifications specified in the arbitration agreement was void. 
35 Arbitration Rules, Arts 7(2)(a)(b), 7(4) and 8(2). 
36G Ezejiofor, “Appointment of an arbitrator under the Nigerian law: the procedure and powers of an appointing authority – Nigerian Paper 
Mills Limited v Pithawalla Engineering GMBH” (1997)/4 The Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal 349 at 351 – 352. Nwakoby, 
however, contended that such a function would be a judicial one because the application for the appointment of arbitrators should be heard in 
court.  GC Nwakoby, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in Nigeria (2nd edn, 2014, Snaap Press Ltd) 51. See also, GC 
Nwakoby, “The constitutionality of section 7(4) and 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act: Chief Felix Ogunwale v Syrian Arab Republic 
revisited” (2003) 1/3 Nigerian Bar Association Law Journal 345 at 353. 





   The jurisdictional issues addressed in this article arise only when the parties invoke the default 
appointment jurisdiction of the courts. Jurisdictional issues do not arise when the parties agree that a judicial 
officer should appoint the arbitrator. Regarding international arbitration, the courts cannot intervene to appoint 
arbitrators if the parties fail to do so. Where the parties fail to designate an appointing authority, the Secretary-
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague is automatically constituted as appointing authority.39 
  
Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Arbitrator Appointments 
The ACA defines “Court” to mean either the State High Court or the Federal High Court or the FCT High Court.40 
The Nigerian Constitution, pursuant to which the ACA itself was enacted, created the various courts and specified 
their jurisdictions.41 The question is whether the parties can approach any of the High Courts mentioned in the 
ACA to seek judicial intervention in the arbitral tribunal constituting process or whether they must approach only 
the High Court (i.e. Federal or State) exercising jurisdiction in the subject matter area of their dispute.   
There is considerable force in the argument that, although the ACA defines a court to mean either of the 
Federal or State High Courts or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, the High Court to which an 
application for appointment of an arbitrator in default of the parties’ selection should be made is the High Court 
which would have had jurisdiction over the dispute but for the arbitration clause.42 This argument is predicated 
on the fact that the ACA is inferior to the Constitution. Thus, the ACA cannot amend the constitutional 
delimitation of the court’s jurisdiction.43 The argument may be supported by certain High Court decisions44 and 
recent decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chevron USA INC v Brittania-U Nigeria Limited45 and Federal 
University of Technology Akure v BMA Ventures Nigeria Limited.46 There are, however, certain other decisions 
to the effect that Nigerian High Courts have coordinate jurisdiction to intervene in aid of arbitration.47      
  Apparently, courts and scholars have not considered the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Magbagbeola v Sanni.48 This case is critical to understanding relevant case law and how it should be interpreted 
in light of the current Nigerian arbitration regime and the Nigerian Constitution.49 In that case, the parties had 
 
39 ACA ss 44(2) and 54(2). 
40 Ibid s 57(1). 
41 CFRN, s 251 (jurisdiction of the Federal High Court), s 257 (jurisdiction of the FCT High Court) and s 272 (jurisdiction of the State High 
Court).  
42 See for instance, Nwakoby, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in Nigeria above at note 36 at 47, “The constitutionality of 
Section 7(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act: Chief Felix Ogunwale v Syrian Arab Republic revisited” above at note 36 at 5; OO 
Olatawura, ”Constitutional foundations of commercial and investment arbitration in Nigerian law and practice” (2014) 40/4 Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin 657 at 683 and OO Olatawura,  “Nigeria’s appellate courts, arbitration and extra-legal jurisdiction: facts, problems, and solutions” 
(2012) 28/1 Arbitration International 63.  
43Nwakoby, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in Nigeria above at note 35 at 48. See also Adedoyin Rhodes-Vivour, 
Commercial Arbitration Law and Practice in Nigeria (LexisNexis 2016) 638. 
44 See Afocon Nig Ltd v Registered Trustees of Ikoyi Club 1936 [1996] FHCLR 371; Imani & Sons Ltd v Bill Construction Co Ltd, Suit No: 
FHC/L/CP/358/97, Belgore CJ (9 March 1998). See further, Access Bank Plc v Akingbola [2014] 3 CLRN 124 where the Lagos State High 
Court refused to register a decision of the English Courts on the basis that the subject matter was constitutionally within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. For the argument that courts should interpret relevant laws in a manner that promotes legal certainty 
and predictability, see PN Okoli, “Subject matter jurisdiction: the recognition and enforcement of English judgments in Nigeria and the need 
for a universal standpoint” (2016) 17 Yearbook of Private International Law 507. 
45 (2018) LPELR-43519(CA). According to this Court of Appeal decision, where the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction over the substantive 
suit, the Court also lacks the jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration agreement by ordering the parties to proceed to arbitration save to apply s 
22 of the Federal High Court Act and transfer the matter to an appropriate court. 
46 (2018) LPELR-44429(CA): the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to enforce an arbitral award on a dispute predicated on a simple 
contract.  
47 See Knight Frank & Rutley  v Delta Steel Co Ltd, Suit No: FHC/L/CS/383/95, Belgore, CJ (5 August 1995); Tidewater Marine Intl Inc New 
Orleans (formerly known as Tidex Intl Inc) v Consolidated Oil Ltd Lagos [1996] FHCLR 324; Grinaker-LTS Construction Nig Ltd v UACN 
Property Development Co Ltd, Suit No: FHC/L/CS/935/10, Idris J (21 February 2011). 
48[2005] 11 NWLR (Pt 936) 239, Katsina-Alu, JSC at 247 – 253. 
49 Nwakoby, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in Nigeria above at note 35 at 46 and Rhodes-Vivour, Commercial Arbitration 
Law and Practice in Nigeria above at note 43 at 182 – 184 cited this case but did not consider its impact on the question. The respondent in 




entered into a partnership agreement to protect their interests in Commerce Lords Nigeria Limited of which they 
were promoters. Commerce Lords Nigeria Limited was in receivership. A dispute then arose between the parties.  
The respondent, relying on the arbitration clause in the partnership agreement, approached the Lagos State High 
Court to appoint an arbitrator. The appellant objected to the Lagos State High Court’s jurisdiction to appoint an 
arbitrator, claiming that the dispute involved the running of a company (an item which was within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal High Court). The Lagos High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the objection. 
Both courts drew a distinction between the receivership pending at the Federal High Court and the Lagos State 
High Court dispute which merely sought to determine the rights of the parties under the partnership agreement of 
which the arbitration clause formed a part. The underlying dispute was predicated on a breach of the partnership 
agreement and could not be subsumed under companies’ proceedings as the appellant claimed. The appellant was 
dissatisfied with the decision of the two courts. The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
affirmed the findings of both lower courts that the underlying dispute did not concern how Commerce Lords 
Nigeria Limited operated – a matter over which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction. The underlying 
dispute rather concerned the interests of both parties considering their partnership agreement on how to share 
proceeds from Commerce Lords Nigeria Limited. Thus, the Supreme Court decided that the Lagos High Court 
had jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator.  
Magbagbeola v Sanni, however, did not clear the confusion arising from conflicting decisions of the lower 
courts because all the courts determined that the underlying dispute was founded on a partnership deed and not 
the management of an incorporated entity under the Companies and Allied Matters Act as erroneously canvassed 
by the appellant. The Lagos High Court before which the application to appoint an arbitrator was brought had 
underlying jurisdiction over the substantive claims. Therefore, Magbagbeola v Sanni should not support any 
argument that the Federal or State High Courts can intervene in arbitration irrespective of subject matter of the 
underlying dispute. This is because the reason for a court’s decision is anchored to the facts.50 Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement (per Katsina-Alu JSC) on the competence of both lower courts to appoint an arbitrator 
was obiter. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Magbagbeola v Sanni can be justified by separating 
the parties’ dispute from the agreement to arbitrate. Clearly, the agreement to arbitrate is separable from the 
parties’ contract.51  Thus, the right of action in cases where judicial intervention is sought in the appointment of 
arbitrators is simply based on the default of a party in appointing an arbitrator as prescribed by the ACA and not 
the cause of action underlying the dispute. Either of the High Courts should have jurisdiction as prescribed by the 
 
Court of Appeal which, however, did not consider the case in its decision that the Federal High Court had no jurisdiction to enforce an arbitral 
award predicated on simple contract. This is because under s 251 of the Nigerian Constitution matters of simple contract are within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the State High Courts. See Adelekan v Ecu-Line NV [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt 993) 33 at 52 Osun State Government v 
Dalami (Nig) Ltd [2007] 9 NWLR (Pt 1038) 66 at 91-92;  P & C.H.S. Co. Ltd v Migfo (Nig) Ltd [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt 1333) 555 at 600 and 
Onuorah v Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemical Company [2005] 6 NWLR (Part 921) 391 at 405. 
50 See Oputa JSC in Adegoke Motors v Adesanya [1989] 5 SCNJ 80: “… the expression of every judge, including the justices of this court, 
must be taken with reference to the facts and peculiar circumstances of the case on which he decides otherwise the law will get into extreme 
confusion. That is why in this judgment, I repeatedly said that the facts frame the issues for decision.” See further, Babatunde v PAS &TA Ltd 
[2007] 13 NWLR (Pt 1050) 113 at 157;  Albiom Construction Ltd v Rao Investment & Properties Ltd [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt 219) 583 at 598; 
Audu v AGF [2012] LPELR-19653 SC; Bhojwani v Bhojwani [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 451) 663; Oyeneye v Odugbesan [1972] 4 SC 244; Obi-
Odu v Duke (No 2) [2005] 10 NWLR (Pt 932) 120; Bamgboye v Unilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt 622) 200; Salami v NNN Ltd [1999] 13 NWLR 
(Pt 634) 315 at 330 and Abacha v Fawehinmi [2000] 4 SC (Pt II) 1. 
51 ACA, s 12(2). See also, NNPC v Klifco Nig Ltd [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt 1255) 209; Heyman v Drawins Ltd [1942] AC 356 at 374; Stabilini 
Visinoni Ltd v Mallinson & Partners Ltd [2014] 12 NWLR (Pt 1420) 134 per Nimpar JCA: “….An arbitration agreement generally exist as a 
clause in a contract agreement is usually treated separately regardless of what the contract is all about. It is a special clause not affected by the 
main contract though part of the contract agreement”. See further, G Nwakoby, ”International commercial arbitration agreement – issue of 




ACA. The State High Courts can exercise jurisdiction based on both the ACA and the fact that simple contracts 
fall within their exclusive jurisdiction.52 The Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction based on the ACA itself 
and section 251(1) of the Constitution: 
 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution and in addition to such 
other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of National Assembly the Federal High 
Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes 
and matters.  
 
Thus, the ACA confers additional jurisdiction on the Federal High Court with respect to the enforcement of the 
contract to arbitrate. Consequently, the Federal High Court’s jurisdiction to intervene in arbitration is not limited 
by subject matter jurisdiction or the subject matter of the substantive action.   A combined reading of section 57 
of the ACA and section 251(1) of the Constitution supports this argument.  If the law is that jurisdiction to 
intervene is limited to only the court with subject matter jurisdiction over the substantive dispute, then only the 
State High Courts are limited in their intervention jurisdiction to constitute arbitral tribunals.53 The Nigerian Court 
of Appeal’s decisions in Chevron USA INC v Brittania-U Nigeria Limited54 and Federal University of Technology 
Akure v BMA Ventures Nigeria Limited55 are, therefore, inaccurate because in both cases the Court of Appeal 
decided that the Federal High Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce arbitral awards predicated on simple 
contract. A harmonious and progressive interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions do not support such 
appellate decisions. 
The need to consider party autonomy vis-à-vis access to the courts is underscored by the increasing 
importance of the National Industrial Court. As earlier noted, the Federal High Court, State High Courts and the 
National Industrial Court are all courts of coordinate jurisdiction. In principle, therefore, no court is superior to 
the other court is subject to its jurisdictional delineations. 
 
  
Appointment of Arbitrators vis-à-vis the Jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court   
The National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine several matters, including “industrial 
relations and other matters arising from the workplace… matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.”56 In 
principle, this jurisdiction does not conflict with the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal High 
Court and the general jurisdiction of the State High Courts.57  By the Constitution, applications for judicial 
intervention in arbitration should be made to the National Industrial Court in disputes relating to 
 
52 See P & CHS Co Ltd v Migfo (Nig) Ltd [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt 1333) 555; Oliver v Dangote Ind Ltd [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt 1150) 467; KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines v Taher [2014] 2 NWLR (Pt 1393) 137; Adelekan v Ecu-Line NV [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt 993) 33; NUT Niger State v 
COSST, Niger State [2012] 10 NWLR (Pt 1307) 89 at 109 and Onuorah v Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemical Co [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt 921) 
393. 
53 This would be subject to the outcome of the intervention jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court considered below.  
54 (2018) LPELR-43519(CA): where the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction over the substantive suit, the court also lacks the jurisdiction to 
enforce the arbitration agreement by ordering the parties to proceed to arbitration save to apply the Federal High Court Act, s 22 and transfer 
the matter to an appropriate court. 
55 (2018) LPELR-44429(CA): the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to enforce an arbitral award on a dispute predicated on a simple 
contract.  
56 CFRN, s 254C (1)(a).  
57  See CFRN, s 254C (1) and National Industrial Court Act 2006, s 7 on the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court generally.  
See also CFRN, s 272 (on the Federal High Court) and CFRN, s 251(1) (on the State High Courts). See also, Okoli and Umeche above at note 




labour/employment matters.58 However, the National Industrial Court is not contemplated in sections 7(2) and 
57(1) of the ACA which provides for judicial intervention in arbitrator appointments and specifies the courts that 
can intervene. In Ravelli v Digitsteel Integrated Services Limited,59 counsel for the applicant unsuccessfully 
argued that the ACA was impliedly amended to include the National Industrial Court as one of the courts that can 
intervene in the appointment of arbitrators.   
Jurisdictional delineations considering the ACA and the Constitution do not provide a definitive solution 
to challenges in the area of arbitration. Section 57(1) of the ACA lists the courts that can exercise intervention 
jurisdiction in arbitration. The National Industrial Court is omitted. In this regard, it should be noted that the ACA, 
promulgated in 1988, predated the establishment of the National Industrial Court as a court of coordinate 
jurisdiction with the Federal and State High Courts. The National Industrial Court was vested with exclusive 
jurisdiction over labour and employment matters in 2010.60   
The earlier decision of the National Industrial Court in Gregory v West African Oil Field Services Ltd61 
arguably strengthened the view that the National Industrial Court could intervene in arbitration to appoint 
arbitrators. The claimant was employed as Chief Operating Officer of the respondent company (West African Oil 
Field Services). His employment was terminated by a letter dated 22 December 2011. Relying on section 
254(c)(1)(a) and (d) of the Constitution, the claimant had obtained an interim injunction by an ex parte application 
restraining his employers from effecting the termination of his employment. The respondent applied to the 
National Industrial Court to discharge the interim injunction citing an arbitration clause requiring disputes arising 
from the employment contract to be arbitrated in London in accordance with the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) Arbitration Rules. The claimant argued that the arbitration clause would oust the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court over labour/employment disputes. The National Industrial Court 
discharged the interim injunction. Upholding the arbitration clause in the employment contract Adejumo J stated: 
 
[….] Once the court comes to the conclusion that parties have agreed to refer disputes to arbitration, 
the court in line with the well established notion that parties are bound to honour their contractual 
obligations should enforce the arbitration agreement. This Court does not share the view that by 
inserting an arbitration clause in the CSA, the parties have agreed to oust the jurisdiction of this court 
under section 254(c)(1) as contended by the claimant/respondent’s counsel.62    
 
Notwithstanding this decision, section 57(1) of the ACA which only lists the Federal and State High Courts as 
courts exercising intervention jurisdiction in arbitration was recently interpreted to exempt the National Industrial 
Court from exercising jurisdiction to intervene in arbitration to appoint arbitrators in default of the parties.  This 
interpretation is evident in three cases: Ravelli v Digitsteel Integrated Services Limited,63 Prakash v Orleans Invest 
Holdings64 and Ajilore v KLM Airlines.65  
 
58 See CFRN, s 254C (3): The National Industrial Court is empowered to exercise “appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over an arbitral 
tribunal… in respect of any matter that the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain.”; Under the CFRN s 254C(4), the National 
Industrial Court is empowered  to “…entertain any application for the enforcement of the award, decision, ruling or order made by any arbitral 
tribunal… connected with, arising from or pertaining to any matter of which the National Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain.” 
59 Above at note 22 at 15. 
60 See s 254C (1) of the CFRN. 
61 [2012] 5 CLRN 176. 
62 Ibid 178. 






In Ravelli v Digitsteel Integrated Services Limited66 the applicant filed originating motion at the National 
Industrial Court seeking the appointment of an arbitrator to resolve a dispute with his erstwhile employers. He  
relied in part on article 22 of his employment contract dated 17 August 2012 (arbitration clause) and section 
7(2)(b) of the Act (default appointment provision). When the motion came up for argument on 28 March 2017, 
Kanyip J on the Court’s own motion, raised the issue of the National Industrial Court’s jurisdiction to appoint an 
arbitrator pursuant to the ACA and asked the parties to address him on the point. Kanyip J then ruled as follows: 
i. The ACA applies only to commercial disputes. Employment and labour disputes fall outside the 
ambit of the ACA.67 
ii.  The fact that the Constitution68 expressly grants exclusive jurisdiction to the National Industrial 
Court over trade disputes under the Trade Disputes Act69 which expressly excludes the ACA from 
application to trade disputes70 strengthens the view that the Act was not meant to be applied to 
labour/employment disputes. 
iii. Case law authorities clarify that the ACA applies only to commercial disputes. Labour/employment 
disputes are not commercial disputes.71  
iv. The ACA expressly listed the Federal, State and FCT High Courts as courts exercising jurisdiction 
under the Act and leaves out the National Industrial Court.  
Kanyip J rejected the argument of the claimant. The claimant had argued that, considering the extensive 
jurisdiction which the Constitution conferred on the National Industrial Court with respect to labour/employment 
matters, the National Industrial Court should be included wherever the Federal and State High Courts are 
mentioned in the ACA to ensure the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to intervene in arbitration 
concerning labour/employment matters and thus appoint arbitrators. Kanyip J emphasised that ”the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act itself recognises the fact that it does not cover all issues”.72  For example, issues that concern 
a violation of the Constitution or any statute cannot be submitted to arbitration tribunals.73 Kanyip J further 
observed that the ACA focused solely on commercial disputes and, therefore, the jurisdiction which the 
Constitution conferred on the National Industrial Court did not apply to the case in question.74  
 Kanyip J essentially declared that the arbitration clause in employment contracts could not be enforced 
in Nigeria. In view of the National Industrial Court’s extensive jurisdiction over labour/employment matters under 
the Constitution, the claimant could not have approached the Federal or State High Courts to appoint the arbitrator. 
His only option would be to institute an action at the National Industrial Court, making the arbitration clause 
 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ravelli v Digitsteel Integrated Services Ltd above at note 22 13, citing the ACA, s 57(1):  
“Arbitration” means a commercial arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution… 
“Commercial” means all relationships of a commercial nature, including any trade transaction for the supply or 
exchange of goods or services, distribution agreement, commercial representation or agency, factoring, leasing, 
construction of works, consulting, engineering, licensing, investment, financing, banking, insurance, exploitation 
agreement or concession, joint venture and other forms of industrial or business cooperation, carriage of goods 
or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.  
The Court also found the long title to the Act relevant: “An Act to provide a unified framework for the fair and efficient settlement of 
commercial disputes by arbitration and conciliation”. See further, A Asouzu, “Arbitration and Judicial Powers in Nigeria” (2001) 18/6 
Journal of International Arbitration 617 at 627 on the ACA applying only to commercial disputes.  
68 CFRN s 254(c)(1)(b).  
69 Cap T8 LFN 2004 (“TDA” hereafter), s 12.  
70Ibid s 12.  
71 Citing Maritime Academy of Nigeria v AQS [2008] All FWLR (Pt 406) 1872 at 1890; Compagnie Generale de Geophysique v Etuk [2003] 
LPELR-5516(CA). 
72 Ravelli v Digitsteel Integrated Services Ltd above at note 22 at 14. 
73 Statoil (Nigeria) Ltd v FIRS [2014] LPELR-23144(CA). 




redundant. On the applicant’s inability to proceed with the arbitration, Kanyip J stated that:  “the applicant foisted 
on himself the position of helplessness that he complains of…” because he could have instituted an action against 
the respondent.75 This, however, contradicts the purpose of arbitration agreements which is to take dispute 
resolution outside the purview of the courts based on party autonomy.  
Bassi J adopted Kanyip J’s reasoning in Prakash v Orleans Invest Holdings76 and Ajilore v KLM 
Airlines.77 Ajilore v KLM Airlines was also an application for judicial intervention of the National Industrial Court 
in the appointment of arbitrators. Here, the employment contract had specified that the sole arbitrator would be 
the employer’s (defendant/respondent’s) General Manager. The employee (claimant) objected to this and applied 
to the National Industrial Court to instead appoint an arbitrator pursuant to the Act. Bassi J declined to appoint 
arbitrator, adopting Kanyip J’s position and decided that the court could not make any orders that would give 
effect to the Act.78 The application was struck out. Interestingly, however, Bassi J was willing to apply order 29(1) 
of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Rules 2017 to refer the matter to an arbitrator if the parties had agreed 
on this point and the application was made under the Rules rather than the ACA.79  This approach indicates that 
the National Industrial Court is not averse to settlement of employment disputes by arbitration. The arbitration in 
the National Industrial Court must be by agreement of the parties while the suit is pending in this court and subject 
to the court having ordered the arbitration.   
Although Bassi J did not consider if it was fair for an employment contract to stipulate that the employer’s 
General Manager should be the arbitrator, Ajilore v KLM Airlines demonstrates the possible unfairness in 
subjecting an employee to his own employer’s agent as a sole arbitrator despite the likelihood of conflicting 
interests.80 This unfairness is complicated by the reluctance of the court to appoint an arbitrator.  Thus, in Prakash 
v Orleans Invest Holdings81 Bassi J, further adopting Kanyip J’s reasoning on the inapplicability of the Act to 
labour/employment matters, refused to stay proceedings under the ACA to require the parties to proceed to 
arbitration. Bassi J rather assumed jurisdiction to determine the dispute, notwithstanding the arbitration clause.  
Clearly, the National Industrial Court is reluctant to appoint arbitrators under the ACA. This court would 
rather exercise jurisdiction to determine the dispute.82 Where the parties agree after an action has been filed at the 
National Industrial Court that the matter be referred to arbitration and make an application to the Court in this 
regard, the judge will then consider referring the dispute to arbitration.83 
In all the cases analysed, the arbitral tribunal would have determined the employment claims rather than 
the National Industrial Court on the basis of an arbitration clause entered at a time the employee was subordinate 
 
75 Ravelli v Digitsteel Integrated Services Ltd above at note 23 at 15. 
76 Above at note 23. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ajilore v KLM Airlines above at note 23 at 8. 
79 This provides: “In any action before the Court, the Court may at any time order the whole cause or matter or any question or issue of facts 
arising therein to be tried before a special referee, officer of the Court, or arbitrator as agreed by the parties.”  
80 See AJS Colvin, “An empirical study of employment arbitration: case outcomes and processes” (2011) 8/1 Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies 1 – 23 for results of a study of employment arbitrations demonstrating how arbitration was disadvantageous to employees in the US. 
Win rates for employees was a mere 21%, far lower than obtained in litigation. In the few cases where the employees won, compensation 
awarded was far lower when compared to litigation. Gross provides two important supporting arguments here: first (in the context of empirical 
studies), “repeat-player advantage garnered by parties with superior bargaining power harms those with weaker bargaining power”; second, 
the “discounting of bargaining endowments weakens both the legitimacy of these settlements and the legitimacy of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution process”. See JI Gross, “Bargaining in the (murky) shadow of arbitration” (2019)/24 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 185, 189-
190. 
81 Above at note 23. 
82 Compare with the English position in Clyde & Co LLP v Bates Van Winkelhof [2011] EWHC 668 (QB): an employee has a statutory right 
to approach an employment tribunal for resolution of his complaints. The employer cannot therefore insist that the dispute be submitted to 
arbitration. See G Bamodu, “Judicial support for arbitration in Nigeria: on interpretation of aspects of Nigeria’s Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act” (2018) 62/2 Journal of African Law 255 at 276. 




to the employer. The question of imbalance of bargaining power invariably arises. There is merit in the approach 
of Bassi J requiring the parties to agree on a resolution by arbitration when the dispute has already arisen and is 
before the National Industrial Court. An arbitration clause in an employment contract which is usually on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis is potentially unfair from the employee’s perspective. The ability of the employee to opt out of 
the arbitration and retain his job should be a relevant factor in determining the enforceability of the arbitration 
clause.84 In Faber v Menard, Inc85 an employee successfully argued that an arbitration clause in his employment 
agreement was procedurally unconscionable because of his weak bargaining power and financial standing 
compared to his employer’s.  The United States Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) decided that the arbitration 
clause was unenforceable. This decision was partly because the employee was told that he must either agree to 
participate in the arbitration program or be replaced.  
The weak bargaining power of employees is particularly important in the Nigerian context. In principle, 
one of the advantages of arbitration is less expenses. However, this is not always the case and in Nigeria employees 
may find arbitration expensive. In fact, litigation is often a cheaper option for employees because the cost of filing 
relevant documents is very minimal.86 Any costs awarded against the employee are also very minimal.  On the 
other hand, employees (especially low and mid-level) will find arbitrators’ fees prohibitive and possible costs will 
be significant. There is, therefore, much to recommend in the argument that employees should not be required to 
pay the arbitrator(s) fees and other arbitration expenses to facilitate the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
with respect to employment contracts.87 Nevertheless such approach raises a different issue of power balance 
during proceedings if one party pays the arbitrator’s fees.  
 
The Finality of the Court’s Arbitrator Appointment Decision in the Arbitration Act 
Apart from the controversy concerning which of the High Courts has jurisdiction to intervene to assist in the 
appointment of arbitrators, there is also controversy as to whether a party dissatisfied with the courts’ appointment 
can appeal the decision appointing the arbitrator.88 Under section 7(4) of the ACA, the decision of the Federal and 
State High Courts on court appointed arbitrators is final and not subject to appeal. In Ogunwole v Syrian Arab 
Republic the respondent was a tenant of the appellant.89 The tenant, upon vacation of the property, demanded a 
refund of the unused rent as provided in the tenancy agreement. The appellant only refunded a part of the 
outstanding sum claiming the difference had been used to restore the premises to a tenantable position. The 
respondent then gave notice of arbitration in accordance with the tenancy agreement, appointing an arbitrator. The 
 
84 S Hickox, ”Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes” (2010)16 Widener Law Review 101 at 113. 
Citing Davis v O'Melveny & Myers, LLC, 485 F.3d 1066, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007). 
85267 F. Supp. 2d 961, 977 (N.D. Iowa 2003), rev’d, 367 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2004).  
86 For the argument that “arbitration is not always practical as it is sometimes expensive in relation to the value of the claim”, see PN Okoli, 
Promoting Foreign Judgments: Lessons in Legal Convergence from South Africa and Nigeria (2019, Wolters Kluwer) 14-15. 
87 Hickcox above at note 84 at 107, citing Cole v Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See further, TP Gies and 
AW Bagley, “Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: What’s New and What’s Next?” (2013) 39/3 Employee Relations Law Journal 
22.  
88 See GC Nwakoby, “Appointment of arbitrators” (2001) 5/3 Modern Practice Journal of Finance and Investment Law 355 and ”The 
Constitutionality of Section 7(4) and 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act: Chief Felix Ogunwale v Syrian Arab Republic revisited” 
above at note 36 at 353; MM Akanbi “Appointment of arbitrators: law and practice” (2001)5/1 Nigeria Law and Policy Journal 26; PO 
ldornigie “The default procedure in the appointment of arbitrators: is the decision of the court appealable?” (2002) 68/4 Arbitration: The 
Journal of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 397 and “Nigeria’s appellate courts, arbitration and extra-legal jurisdiction—facts, problems, 
and solutions: a rejoinder” (2015) 31 Arbitration International 171 at 174; CE Ibe, “Party autonomy and the constitutionality of Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1988, Sections 7(4) and 34” (2011)28/5 Journal of International Arbitration 493; OO Olatawura, 
“Constitutional foundations of commercial and investment arbitration in Nigerian law and practice” (2014)40/4 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
657 and “Nigeria’s appellate courts, arbitration and extra-legal jurisdiction: facts, problems, and solutions” (2012) 28/1 Arbitration 
International 63.  




appellant failed to appoint an arbitrator and the respondent thus applied to the court under section 7(2) of the 
ACA, for a court appointed arbitrator. The respondent’s application was granted, and the court appointed Ajomo 
arbitrator. The appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal, citing sections 7 and 
34 of the ACA under which no appeal could be entertained with respect to the court’s appointment of arbitrators.90 
Scholars, legal practitioners and commentators have seriously debated the finality of the court’s decision 
appointing an arbitrator. In justifying the restriction of appeals, for example, it has been argued that a party can 
challenge the court appointed arbitrator under section 8(3) of the ACA.91 The rationale behind this argument is 
that rather than appeal the decision of the court in appointing an arbitrator, it is better to challenge the arbitrator 
before the arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, since this option of a challenge is available, the decision of the court in 
appointing an arbitrator is not final and is thus not affected by section 241 of the Constitution that guarantees a 
right to appeal final decisions of the High Courts. This argument is insightful, but section 8(3) of the ACA only 
provides limited grounds for challenging an arbitrator. These grounds may be juxtaposed with the myriad of 
reasons for which the decision of a court may be appealed, including the grounds of procedure adopted by the 
court. Besides, it is unfair and undermines legal certainty to allow a party who either failed to raise objections to 
the appointment of an arbitrator during the court proceedings or whose objections have already been dismissed 
by a competent court to raise such an objection at the arbitral tribunal.  
Some other scholars have argued that the statutory provision which restricts appeals was made during 
the Nigerian military era when decrees were supreme. Thus, it is doubtful that the provision would be valid unless 
the Constitution is amended to provide for such exceptions.92  This view is supported by Nigerian Agip Oil 
Company Ltd v Kemmer, 93 where the Court of Appeal decided that the decision of a High Court appointing an 
arbitrator is appealable considering section 241 of the Constitution which provides that litigants are entitled to 
appeal the decisions of the Federal and State High Courts. However, the effect of conflicting decisions of the 
Nigerian Court of Appeal remains challenging.94 Thus, case law is unclear as to whether parties can appeal 
decisions concerning the appointment of arbitrators. Similar issues were earlier raised with respect to whether 
decisions of the National Industrial Court could be appealed to the Court of Appeal. Some earlier decisions of the 
Court of Appeal indicate that all decisions of the National Industrial Court could be appealed.95 There are also 
later decisions of same Court of Appeal that not all decisions of the National Industrial Court could be appealed, 
except criminal or fundamental rights decisions.96 Because of the conflicting decisions, the law on the right to 
appeal National Industrial Court decisions was rather unclear until the parties in Skye Bank Plc v Iwu requested 
the Court of Appeal to state a case for the Supreme Court’s guidance.97 The Supreme Court ruled that all first 
 
90 See also Nig Agip Oil Co Ltd v Kemmer [2001] NWLR (Pt 716) 506, 525; Bendex Eng v Efficient Petroleum Nig Ltd [2001] 8 NWLR (Pt 
715) 338.     
91 Ibe above at note 88. 
92 Orojo and Ajomo above at note 29 at 121. 
93 Above at note 90 at 525 – 526. 
94 Some commentators argue that where decisions of the Court of Appeal conflict lower courts are free to apply anyone of them. See E Essien, 
“Conflicting rationes decidendi: the dilemma of the lower courts in Nigeria” (2000) 12 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
20. Other commentators argue that the later decision prevails. See CO Idahosa,  The Doctrine of “Stare –Decisis” and Judicial Precedent: 
the Need for Lower Courts to be Bound by Decisions of the Superior Courts of Record (Paper delivered at the Conference of All Nigeria 
Judges of the Lower Courts held between 21st–25th November, 2016) 17. See further, Bronik Motors v Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296, 
CBN v Zakari (2018) LPELR-44751(CA), Osakwe v Federal College of Education (2010) 3 SCNJ 529 at 546. 
95 Local Government Service Commission, Ekiti State v Jegede (2013) LPELR-21131, Local Government Service Commission, Ekiti State v 
Bamisaye (2013) LPELR-20407, Local Government Service Commission, Ekiti State  v Olamiju (2013) LPELR- 20409, Local Government 
Service Commission, Ekiti State  v Asubiojo (2013) LPELR-20403, Federal Ministry of Health v The Trade Union Members of the Joint Health 
Sectors Unions (2014) LPELR-2354 (CA). 
96 Coca-Cola (Nig) Ltd v Akinsanya [2013] 18 NWLR (Pt 1385) 225, Lagos Sheraton Hotel & Towers v HPSSSA [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt 1426) 
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instance decisions of the National Industrial Court could be appealed. According to Eko JSC in that case, the 
decisions of the National Industrial Court should not be final and conclusive as to prevent an appeal. In other 
words, “the right to appeal against the decision of a first instance Court or tribunal is a basic Constitutional right”.98 
Considering section 36(2) of the Constitution which provides a right to appeal, the correct position of the law was 
stated in Nigerian Agip Oil Co Ltd v Kemmer.99  There is a right to appeal the decision of the High Court in 
appointing an arbitrator. If such issues arise again, the Court of Appeal could state a case for the Supreme Court’s 
directions or be guided by the Supreme Court’s attitude on appeals as seen in Skye Bank Plc v Iwu.100 This 
approach is consistent with constitutional provisions that guarantee access to the courts. Although arbitration 
clauses should discourage litigation, there should be a contextual consideration of circumstances where parties 
will suffer injustice if they do not have a right to appeal.  Such injustice is complicated by the peculiarities of 
Nigeria where litigants are sometimes unable to access any court due to jurisdictional conflicts between the 
Federal High Court, State High Courts and the National Industrial Court.101  
 
Conclusion  
Generally, legal principles that concern the appointment of arbitrators are straightforward. In Nigeria, however, 
complexities can arise when courts need to appoint arbitrators.  Thus, the High Courts have jurisdiction to appoint 
arbitrators where the parties fail to do so but there is no legal certainty as to which High Court: State High Court, 
Federal High Court or the National Industrial Court. The rules on whether the Federal, FCT and State High Courts 
in Nigeria have jurisdiction under section 57 of the ACA, irrespective of the subject matter of the underlying 
dispute, are unclear and riddled with conflicting authorities. The prudent course would be to apply for the 
appointment of arbitrators in either the Federal High Court or the State High Court that ordinarily exercises 
jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. However, determining which High Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
can be a complex and uncertain process. Where it is unclear which High Court should exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction over the dispute, the Federal High Court should prima facie have jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators 
since the Nigerian Constitution read alongside the ACA has vested the Federal High Court with additional 
jurisdiction.102 With regard to labour/employment disputes, clearly, none of the High Courts can exercise 
jurisdiction to intervene in the appointment of arbitrators.103 Based on case law analysis, the National Industrial 
Court is unlikely to enforce the arbitration clause in an employment contract by appointing an arbitrator. 
Nevertheless, the decision of the National Industrial Court in Ajilore v KLM Airlines strongly suggests that the 
National Industrial Court is not averse to submission agreements.104 In such a case, the appropriate course is to 
institute an action at the National Industrial Court and the parties can agree to refer the matter to arbitration as 
directed by the National Industrial Court. On this basis, the National Industrial Court can appoint an arbitrator 
pursuant to order 29(1) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Rules 2017 and not under the ACA which the 
National Industrial Court has clearly ruled does not apply to labour/employment disputes. 
 
98 ibid.  
99 Above at note 90. 
100Above at note 97. 
101 Above at note 14. 
102 This is considering a combined reading of ACA, s 57 and CFRN, s 251(1). 
103 CFRN s 254C(1)(a)(3) & (4).  




There is considerable legal uncertainty as to whether litigants can appeal any decision of the High Courts 
concerning the appointment of arbitrators. 105 Until there is a clear resolution of this issue, Skye Bank Plc v Iwu is 
instructive and should provide guidance to discourage any curtailment of the right to appeal.106 In this context of 
judicial intervention in arbitrator appointments, the prospect of parties having difficulties in accessing  the courts 
due to jurisdictional conflicts over which they lack control is unfair and undermines arbitration. 
 
 
105 Ogunwole v Syrian Arab Republic Nigerian above at note 89 and Agip Oil Company Ltd  v Kemmer above at note 88). See further, Bendex 
Eng v Efficient Petroleum Nig Ltd above at note 90).  
106Above at note 97. 
